Report of Inspection of MKULTRA/TSD
This is the CIA's own internal review of MKUltra, written ten years into the program and four years before it was formally terminated. Inspector General J.S. Earman submitted it to the Director of Central Intelligence on July 26, 1963. He had it prepared in one copy only, which is stated on the cover memorandum. That single-copy instruction is itself significant: it tells you how the program was managed throughout its existence.
The report is the most candid internal government document produced about MKUltra while it was still running. It identifies four specific problems the Inspector General considered dangerous. Research in manipulating human behavior is considered by many professionals to be unethical, placing the reputations of participants in jeopardy. Some MKULTRA activities raise questions of legality. A final phase of testing MKULTRA products places the rights and interests of U.S. citizens in jeopardy. Public disclosure of some aspects of MKULTRA activity could induce serious adverse reaction in U.S. public opinion.
The report documents that by 1963 only two individuals in the Technical Services Division had full substantive knowledge of the program, and most of that knowledge was unrecorded. Files were notably incomplete, poorly organized, and lacking in evaluative statements. The program management relied primarily on oral communication.
The most significant finding concerns the covert testing program. Since 1955 the CIA had been administering MKULTRA substances to unwitting U.S. citizens through an informal arrangement with officials of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics. The arrangement funded two safehouses — one in San Francisco, one in New York — at $10,000 per year each. Test subjects included informers, members of criminal organizations, and individuals at all social levels, described explicitly as high and low, native American and foreign. The Inspector General found no effective cover story existed for this program, that present practice was to maintain no records of the planning and approval of test programs, and that the senior command of CIA lacked adequate protection against the high risks involved. He recommended termination.
The report also reveals that TSD had initiated 144 subprojects relating to the control of human behavior during the program's ten years of operation, with 25 remaining active at the time of the inspection.
Tab A attached to this report is the original April 3, 1953 Richard Helms memorandum to Director of Central Intelligence proposing the program, the Tab A description of Project MKULTRA, and the April 13, 1953 Allen Dulles memorandum approving it. These are the founding documents of MKUltra. Tab B is the MKDELTA Materials instruction governing operational use of behavioral control substances in clandestine operations. Tab C is the MKULTRA funding record for FY 1960-1963, showing annual program expenditures.
TOP SECRET — Copy 1 of 1
26 July 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Report of Inspection of MKULTRA
1. In connection with our survey of Technical Services Division, DD/P, it was deemed advisable to prepare the report of the MKULTRA program in one copy only, in view of its unusual sensitivity.
2. This report is forwarded herewith.
3. The MKULTRA activity is concerned with the research and development of chemical, biological, and radiological materials capable of employment in clandestine operations to control human behavior. The end products of such research are subject to very strict controls including a requirement for the personal approval of the Deputy Director/Plans for any operational use made of these end products.
4. The cryptonym MKULTRA encompasses the R&D phase and a second cryptonym MKDELTA denotes the DD/P system for control of the operational employment of such materials. The provisions of the MKULTRA authority also cover [redacted b(1) b(3)]. The administration and control of this latter activity were found to be generally satisfactory and are discussed in greater detail in the main body of the report on TSD.
5. MKULTRA was authorized by the then Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. Allen W. Dulles, in 1953. The TSD was assigned responsibility thereby to employ a portion of its budget, eventually set at 20%, for research in behavioral materials under purely internal and compartmented controls (further details are provided in paragraph 3 of the attached report). Normal procedures for project approval, funding, and accounting were waived. However, special arrangements for audit of expenditures have been evolved in subsequent years.
6. The scope of MKULTRA is comprehensive and ranges from the search for and procurement of botanical and chemical substances, through programs for their analysis in scientific laboratories, to progressive testing for effect on animals and human beings. The testing on individuals begins under laboratory conditions employing every safeguard and progresses gradually to more and more realistic operational simulations. The program requires and obtains the services of a number of highly specialized authorities in many fields of the natural sciences.
7. The concepts involved in manipulating human behavior are found by many people both within and outside the Agency to be distasteful and unethical. There is considerable evidence that opposition intelligence services are active and highly proficient in this field. The experience of TSD to date indicates that both the research and the employment of the materials are expensive and often unpredictable in results. Nevertheless, there have been major accomplishments both in research and operational employment.
8. The principal conclusions of the inspection are that the structure and operational controls over this activity need strengthening; improvements are needed in the administration of the research projects; and some of the testing of substances under simulated operational conditions was judged to involve excessive risk to the Agency.
9. Attached for the signature of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence is a memorandum transmitting the report to the Deputy Director/Plans requesting a summary of action taken or comments on the recommendations contained therein.
J.S. Earman, Inspector General
Attachments — as stated
1. Technical Services Division (TSD), (then Technical Support Staff), received authorization from the then Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. Allen W. Dulles, on 3 April 1953 to develop and maintain continuing operational capabilities in the fields of a) [redacted b(1) b(3)] and b) chemical and biological materials capable of producing human behavioral and physiological changes, (see Tab A). The cryptonym MKULTRA was assigned to encompass TSD's research, development and equipment activities in these two fields. The cryptonym MKDELTA had already been assigned by DD/P Notice No. 220-1 on 20 October 1952 (since revised — see Tab B) as the indicator covering DD/P policy and procedure for the use of biochemicals in clandestine operations.
2. The MKULTRA charter provides only a brief presentation of the rationale of the authorized activities. The sensitive aspects of the program as it has evolved over the ensuing ten years are the following:
a. Research in the manipulation of human behavior is considered by many authorities in medicine and related fields to be professionally unethical, therefore the reputations of professional participants in the MKULTRA program are on occasion in jeopardy.
b. Some MKULTRA activities raise questions of legality implicit in the original charter.
c. A final phase of the testing of MKULTRA products places the rights and interests of U.S. citizens in jeopardy.
d. Public disclosure of some aspects of MKULTRA activity could induce serious adverse reaction in U.S. public opinion, as well as stimulate offensive and defensive action in this field on the part of foreign intelligence services.
3. In recognition of the sensitivity of MKULTRA, TSD was authorized exclusive control of the administration, records, and financial accountings of the program. Simple statements of certification were all that were required of TSD to obtain advances of funds from Finance Division. The DCI's memorandum also exempted MKULTRA from audit, but this provision was modified to permit limited audit before the end of the first year. Funding of MKULTRA was eventually stabilized at 20 percent of TSD's annual research and development budget. It has fallen in the neighborhood of [redacted b(3)] per year over the ten-year history of the program, of which about 30 percent has been allocated to support of the [redacted b(1) b(3)]. See Tab C for MKULTRA funding record FY 60-63.
5. The inspection of MKULTRA projects in biochemical controls of human behavior raised questions in the following area of policy and management which are dealt with in the balance of this report:
a. Scope of the MKULTRA charter: Various projects do not appear to have been sufficiently sensitive to warrant waiver of normal Agency procedures for authorization and control. Other secure channels for establishment and funding of Agency-sterile activities have been evolved over the past ten years by Deputy Director/Support and in some cases could reasonably be employed by TSD in lieu of MKULTRA procedures. In view of these developments there is substantial agreement among all parties concerned that redefinition of the scope of MKULTRA is now appropriate.
b. MKULTRA management policies: The original charter documents specified that TSD maintain exacting control of MKULTRA activities. In so doing, however, TSD has pursued a philosophy of minimum documentation in keeping with the high sensitivity of some of the projects. Some files were found to present a reasonably complete record, while others with parallel objectives contained little or no data at all. There are just two individuals in TSD who have full substantive knowledge of the program and most of that knowledge is unrecorded. Both are highly skilled, highly motivated, professionally competent individuals. In protecting the sensitive nature of the American intelligence capability to manipulate human behavior, they apply "need to know" doctrine to their professional associates and to their clerical assistants to a maximum degree.
c. Advanced testing of MKULTRA materials: It is the firm doctrine in TSD that testing of materials under accepted scientific procedures fails to disclose the full pattern of reactions and attributions that may occur in operational situations. TSD initiated a program for covert testing of materials on unwitting U.S. citizens in 1955. The present report reviews the rationale and risks attending this activity and recommends termination of such testing in the United States.
23. Technical shortcomings of the drugs: As of 1960 no effective knockout pill, truth serum, aphrodisiac, or recruitment pill was known to exist. MKDELTA was described as inherently a high-risk, low-yield field of operations. Three years later the situation remains substantially unchanged, with the exception that real progress has been made in the use of drugs in support of interrogation.
30. TSD has initiated 144 projects relating to the control of human behavior during the ten years of operation of the MKULTRA program. Twenty-five (25) of these projects remain in existence at the present time, while a number of others are in various stages of termination.
To date this chain of command has relied primarily on oral communication in the management of MKULTRA. Files are notably incomplete, poorly organized, and lacking in evaluative statements that might give perspective to management policies over time. A substantial portion of the MKULTRA record appears to rest in the memories of the principal officers and is therefore almost certain to be lost with their departures.
11. TSD entered into an informal arrangement with certain cleared and witting individuals in the Bureau of Narcotics in 1955 which provided for the release of MKULTRA materials for such testing as those individuals deemed desirable and feasible. The initial arrangement obtained the services of a senior representative of the Bureau and one of his assistants on the West Coast. A parallel arrangement was established on the East Coast in 1961. The Director of the Bureau has been briefed on the activity, but the Deputy Chief, TSD, is of the opinion that the former would disclaim all knowledge and responsibility in the event of compromise. The sum of $10,000 has been provided annually to each of the two projects to cover cost of cultivation of targets and of maintenance of a safehouse in each area for the observation of effects of substances on selected test individuals.
12. The particular advantage of these arrangements with the Bureau of Narcotics officials has been that test subjects could be sought and cultivated within the setting of narcotics control. Some subjects have been informers or members of suspect criminal elements from whom the Bureau has obtained results of operational value through the tests. On the other hand, the effectiveness of the substances on individuals at all social levels, high and low, native American and foreign, is of great significance and testing has been performed on a variety of individuals within these categories.
17. The final stage of covert testing of materials on unwitting subjects is clearly the most sensitive aspect of MKULTRA. No effective cover story appears to be available. TSD officials state that responsibility for covert testing is transferred to the Bureau of Narcotics. Yet they also predict that the Chief of the Bureau would disclaim any knowledge of the activity. Present practice is to maintain no records of the planning and approval of test programs.
18. Weighing possible benefits of such testing against the risks of compromise and of resulting damage to CIA has led the Inspector General to recommend termination of this phase of the MKULTRA program. Existing checks and balances on the working level management of such testing do not afford the senior command of CIA adequate protection against the high risks involved.
TOP SECRET — Security Information — T.S. 87624 — Copy 1 of 5 copies
3 April 1953
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Two Extremely Sensitive Research Programs
1. Approximately 6% of the TSS research and development effort lies in two highly sensitive fields in which it is not possible to conduct the work through the customary contracts for security reasons and other considerations.
2. These two sensitive fields are: a) Covert studies of biological and chemical warfare; b) [redacted b(1) b(3)].
3. Permission of the DCI is requested to handle work in these two fields in the manner outlined in Tab A without contracts and with reimbursement to be made against invoices properly certified by TSS.
Richard Helms, Acting Deputy Director (Plans)
7. It is therefore, requested that the DCI authorize TSS to handle 6% of the previously approved research budget for FY '53 without the establishment of formal contractual relations. This program will be known as Project MKULTRA.
This 6% will be used for: Research to develop a capability in the covert use of biological and chemical materials. This area involves the production of various physiological conditions which could support present or future clandestine operations. For example: we intend to investigate the development of a chemical material which causes a reversible non-toxic aberrant mental state, the specific nature of which can be reasonably well predicted for each individual. This material could potentially aid in discrediting individuals, eliciting information, implanting suggestion and other forms of mental control.
5. In many cases in field (a) where the researcher can be cleared and may be aware of our interest in the program, he is unwilling to have his name on a contract which remains out of his control in our files. Experience has shown that qualified, competent individuals in the field of pharmacological, physiological, psychiatric and other biological sciences are most reluctant to enter into signed agreements of any sort which connect them with this activity since such a connection would jeopardize their professional reputations.
SECRET — Security Information — Central Intelligence Agency, Washington 25, D.C. — Office of the Director — APR 13 1953
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Administration)
SUBJECT: Project MKULTRA — Extremely Sensitive Research and Development Program
4. I have, therefore, approved the obligation and expenditure by TSS of 6% of the total budget already approved by the PRC for research for FY '53 without the signing of the usual contracts or other written agreements.
5. This 6% will be handled as Project MKULTRA.
6. No further documents will be required to justify payment of the invoices. Exacting control will be maintained over the Project by TSS.
ALLEN W. DULLES, Director, Central Intelligence
SECRET — Technical Support — 22 July 1960
MKDELTA MATERIALS
1. GENERAL: MKDELTA materials are certain chemical and biological materials (including K and L tablets) capable of producing human behavioral or physiological changes. Such materials may be obtained only in accordance with the provisions of this instruction.
2. POLICY: a. The use of MKDELTA materials will be limited to situations in the exercise of official duties which clearly justify such use. b. Their issuance will be strictly controlled and will require in each instance the written approval of the Deputy Director (Plans). c. MKDELTA materials not used for the purpose for which they were issued will be promptly returned to TSD.
4. RECORDS: The Chief, TSD, will maintain a record of all issuances, to include the date of issuance, the name and signature of the immediate recipient, and a reference to the approved memorandum request.
RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR., Deputy Director (Plans)
FY 1960 — Research Program: $9,225,798 — MKULTRA: $879,004 — 8.7% — Total: $10,104,802
FY 1961 — Research Program: $10,672,462 — MKULTRA: $930,601 — 8.0% — Total: $11,603,063
FY 1962 — Research Program: $10,470,109 — MKULTRA: [redacted b(1) b(3)] — 11.9% — Total: [redacted]
FY 1963* — Research Program: $7,495,273 — MKULTRA: [redacted] — 7.3% — Total: $8,087,687
* Through 8 May 1963.
Note: The MKULTRA funding column shows that the program consistently exceeded its nominal 6% budget authorization, running between 7.3% and 11.9% of the total TSD research and development budget across the period covered.
Central Intelligence Agency, Inspector General J.S. Earman. Report of Inspection of MKULTRA/TSD. July 26, 1963. Top Secret. One copy. CIA FOIA document number C06767515. Approved for release 2019/04/03.
Original source: CIA FOIA Reading Room — document C06767515 →
Archived copy: archive.is/OIL7W →
NOTE: This document was prepared in one copy only and filed separately from the MKULTRA operational records. This is why it survived the 1973 destruction order. It is the most complete surviving internal account of the program's structure and operations.
The Colonial Authority in The Interference did not emerge from speculation. It emerged from reading this document. The safehouse infrastructure, the unwitting subject protocol, the one-copy-only classification level, the recommendation for termination that was ignored for another decade. These are operational procedures confirmed in the CIA's own internal record. The mesh program in the novel is the safehouse model extended forward in time and outward in scale.
The Interference begins with a patent. US3951134, filed in 1974, describes a device for remotely monitoring and altering human brain waves without physical contact. The patent is real. The USPTO granted it. The documents on this site are what precedes it.
The fiction begins exactly where the public record stops answering questions.
The Interference Mars book series written by William Ray Brown begins here: williamraybrown.com →
This site costs real money to run. If it's useful to you, you can help keep it going →